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MEMORIES FROM THE FRONTLINE: MEMORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE IN JEAN DE WAURIN'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF VERNEUIL (1424)

Memórias da linha de frente: memória e justificação da violência no relato de Jean de Waurin sobre a batalha de Verneuil (1424)

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Resumo:
Este artigo utiliza uma análise aprofundada do relato da testemunha ocular de Jean de Waurin sobre a batalha de Verneuil (1424) para argumentar que a memória foi usada para defender a conduta violenta na guerra. Usando o contexto histórico e literário da corte da Borgonha do século XV e a tradição da guerra justa medieval, o artigo discute a justiça e o cavalheirismo na releitura de uma memória pessoal. Em última análise, a narrativa de Waurin demonstrou a crença de que a violência em busca da justiça não era incompatível com a virtude cristã. Waurin usou sua memória para defender sua própria conduta pessoal, bem como a conduta de seus companheiros. O autor demonstrou esse argumento por meio de várias técnicas de "emplotting", colocando várias vinhetas detalhadas dentro da narrativa geral da batalha. O autor então escreveu a memória "ideal" do exército inglês e tentou formar a memória do evento na mente de seu público.

Palavras-chave: Memória; justiça; Jean de Waurin.

Abstract:
This article uses an in-depth analysis of Jean de Waurin's eyewitness account of the battle of Verneuil (1424) to argue that memory was used to defend violent conduct within warfare. Using the historical and literary context of the fifteenth-century Burgundian court and the medieval just war tradition the article discusses justice and chivalry within the retelling of a personal memory. Ultimately Waurin's narrative demonstrated a belief that violence in pursuit of justice was not incompatible with Christian virtue. Waurin used his memory to defend his own personal conduct as well as the conduct of his comrades. The author demonstrated this argument through various "emplotting" techniques, placing various detailed vignettes within the overall narrative of the battle. The author then wrote the "ideal" memory of the English army and attempted to form the memory of the event in the minds of his audience.

Keywords: : Memory, Justice, Jean de Waurin**.**

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Introduction[1]

"It is sometimes alleged that the eye-witness understood nothing of military actions, or that they were not capable of passing fair judgment on them." (Verbruggen, 1998, p. 16). This was a statement often made by historians of the Renaissance or the nineteenth-century "positivist school" of history but was rejected in J.F. Verbruggen's classic work *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe*. (1998, p. 9, p.17). Rather Verbruggen stated that eyewitnesses were often the best describers of battles. This was especially true when the witness was a veteran; well equipped with a contemporary understanding of units, discipline, customs, equipment, and most importantly the state of mind of the soldiers. (Verbruggen, 1998, pp. 17-18).[2] Historical eyewitness testimony has often been looked upon suspiciously due to the limits of perspective and the unreliability of memory. (Verbruggen, pp. 16-17; Funck-Brentano, 1891, p. 27, Erasmus, 1828, pp. 29-30).[3] This is in part true. For example, in a modern context one soldier could describe their own perspective of combat, but a war reporter would be able to provide and combine dozens (or even hundreds) of perspectives, arguably more accurately portraying the event. However, that reporter would be reliant upon multiple, equally perspectival, memories. Although this synthesis may produce something closer to accuracy, this is not a given. Both the reporter working with current testimonies and the historian working with spoken or written records only have memory as a source to describe past events and past contexts. (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 7). The intersection of history and memory is especially conducive to the study of warfare. Since war has been experienced by every civilization through history and has been extensively recorded, allowing a breadth of resources to provide a comparative study of the relationship between the memory of warfare to culture and history. (Cox, 2018, p. 549). This article will use the eyewitness account of a veteran during the battle of Verneuil (1424), in the latter stages of the Hundred Years War, to identify unique narratives which will help determine the framework upon which late-medieval soldiers used memory to justify warfare. [4]

The study of memory has a long historiography. Some would argue that modern conceptions of memory and history began with Maurice Halbwach's (1877-1945) work

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On Collective Memory (1980, pp. 80-81; Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, 2011, p.16-22). Halbwach demonstrated that people's memories were shaped by both their cultural context and their own personal perspectives. (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, 2011, pp. 19-21). This emphasis on subjectivism has fit well within the idea of "critical history" first put forth by Friedrich Nietzsche and later followed by Michel Foucault's idea of "counter-memory." (Nietzsche, 1997, pp. 69-70, pp. 72-77; Foucault, 1977, pp. 118-20). Within the historical discipline, the work of Hayden White has proposed that history has little to distinguish it from fiction as it uses the same representative symbols and narrative structures. (White, 1987, pp. ix-xi, pp. 5-6, pp. 24-25; *inter alia*.). This is helpful because it reminds the historian that memory is flawed. One can never reach the true past because all of history is mediated through the culturally and personally derived symbols of language, images, and objects.[5] However, medieval historians unapologetically used narrative to present their memories and explain historical and contemporary events. By critically looking at historical narratives, the meaning of the text can be more easily extrapolated, and the author's worldview, as presented through their memory, can be made more apparent. This is not to say that a critical look at narrative will find the truth of the text, or the intention of the author. Yet, it can help develop an imperfect, but still useful, representation of what the author described and potential reasons why they described it that way. The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur argued that narrative is essential to historical truth. (Ricoeur, 1990, p. 52). Ricoeur admitted that even experience in the present is not "truth" but a "likeness (*memesis*)" of the "truth." Between the "likeness" of present experience (*memesis* 1) and the "likeness" passed onto others to both present and future communities (*memesis* 3) is the "likeness" of remembering the past event (*memesis* 2). (Ricoeur, 1990, p. 52). This hermeneutic between personal experience and cultural assimilation takes place through the form of narrative and shapes and is shaped by the actors' worldviews. (Ricoeur, 1990, pp. 64-70). The importance of narrative in the pursuit of medieval perspectives was argued by Gabrielle Spiegel and her idea of the "social logic of the text." (1997, pp. xviii-xix, pp. 15-27). [6] She argued that texts find deeper meaning after being seen within their historical context, and likewise the narrative can further define the context itself. In this way, by examining the narratives that represent the memory of authors we can better understand the medieval perspective.

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As memory has become more important in medieval studies, several authors have argued that there needs to be further analysis of eyewitness testimonies. (Cassidy-Welch, 2008, pp. 133-50; Milner, 2006, pp. 484-507; Curry (ed.), 2019, pp. 153-68; Mauskopf Delyannis (ed.), 2003, pp. 249-76, pp. 387-416). One such eyewitness account was Jean de Waurin's fifteenth-century retelling of the battle of Verneuil (1424). Waurin was present at this important moment in the latter stages of the Hundred Years War. It is the most detailed account of the battle, with added narratives which suggest a defence of Christian violence during the war. This article will argue that Waurin's memories of Verneuil point towards a worldview that tried to normalize Christian violence within the historical context of the just war tradition and the literary context of the chivalric chronicle.[7] The focus of the article will be on an in-depth analysis of Waurin's narrative, his rhetoric, and what his potential goals were in writing the account. Thus, the paper will examine Waurin's work, its time of writing, and place the narrative of the battle of Verneuil within those literary and historical contexts. Then Waurin's narrative will be critiqued using the just war tradition as a guide to help form a representation of a medieval combat veteran's perspective of killing within warfare. Throughout it will be made apparent that Waurin used memory as a tool to defend the English cause in France, and ultimately defend his own past actions. Additionally, it will show that Waurin's chivalric context used Christian and chivalric virtues to explain the horrors of war and defend war's actions.

Historical and Literary Context

Jean de Waurin was born around 1400, he was the illegitimate son of Robert de Waurin, the hereditary seneschal of Flanders and counsellor to the Duke of Burgundy. (Visser-Fuchs, 2004; Marchandisse, 2006, p. 508). Waurin had an expansive military career. At fifteen he witnessed the battle of Agincourt (1415) while positioned within the French baggage train. Later as a knight, he fought with the Burgundians against the French in 1417 and against the Hussites in 1420. (Naber, 1987, pp. 286-87). After the Anglo-Burgundian alliance (1419) he fought under both Burgundian and English banners at many of the most important battles and campaigns of the later Hundred Years War, including Crevant (1423), in the Mâconnais(1424), Verneuil (1424), in Holland and

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Hainault (1427), in the Orléanais (1428), and Patay (1429). (Naber, 1987, pp. 287-89). After the Treaty of Arrass (1435), and the alliance between Burgundy and France, he then fought against the English at the siege of Cailais (1436). (Naber, 1987, pp. 287-89). More importantly for this topic, Waurin recorded his perspective of these events within a large work encompassing all of English history called *Recueil des Chroniques et Anchiennes Istoires de la Grant Bretaigne: a present nomme Engleterre* [A Collection of Chronicles and Ancient Histories of Great Britain: Now Called England]. (Waurin, 1864-91).

The Collection was originally a compilation of chronicles documenting the history of England from the conquest of Britain by the Syrian princess Albine, until the death of Henry IV in 1413. (Waurin, 1864 a, pp. 1-25; Waurin, 1868 a, pp. 165-67; Marchandisse, 2006, p. 510; Visser-Fuchs, 2004). These narratives were mostly copied from different chronicles that were popular during the fifteenth century. (Jante, 2019, pp. 349-50). [8] Having completed the first four volumes, Waurin continued his collection with events from his own lifetime, collected into two more volumes. While doing this he often copied the style (or even full passages) of contemporary Burgundian chroniclers including Matthieu d'Escouchy, Jacques Duclerq, Jean le Fèvre and Enguerrand de Monstrelet. (Jante, 2019, p. 350; Visser-Fuchs, 2004; Naber, 1987, pp. 281-93). Despite his reliance on other authors, his passages also contain his unique perspective born from his varied experiences during the war. As a soldier and an Anglophile, Waurin was mostly interested in military history and attempted to describe the English in the best possible light. Georges le Brusque has characterized Waurin's work as a "Burgundian chivalric chronicler", a genre which was especially complimentary about warfare as compared to the more critical contemporary French chivalric and monastic chronicles. (2004, pp. 77-78). In general, chivalric chronicles purposely preserved the great deeds of great men during warfare. (Given-Wilson, p. 1, pp. 6-9).[9] Using the oral testimony of heralds and combatants, chivalric chroniclers vignetted especially brave or impressive feats during combat. This was done within an overarching narrative of the campaign, which preserved the names of the highest-ranking noble combatants and casualties. In Burgundy, the chronicle tradition was known for its epic prose and its overall positive image of war. (Brusque, 2004, pp. 77-81). Waurin's work is generally consistent with this description and matches his own stated purpose:

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> *tous les haulx fais diceulx roys, de leur proesses et de leurs vyes, et comment par leur noble chevalerie, le temps de chascun durnat, le dit royaulme a este gouveerne.*
>
> [to retell] all the lofty deeds of those [English] kings, of their prowess and of their lives, and how, during each one's time, they governed the said kingdom by their noble chivalry.] (Waurin, 1864 a, p. 2; Waurin, 1864 b,).[10]

Although Waurin is generally typical with other Brugundian chroniclers, he is atypical as well. His own personal experience of combat presents a unique perspective throughout the contemporary sections of the *Collection*. Additionally, his political leanings toward the English side have allowed for the English perspective to be portrayed in many events where few English sources survive. (e.g. the battle of Patay, see: Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 170-88). In this particular instance, Waurin uniquely described the English flawlessly. The other Burgundians were complimentary of the English but more neutral. (le Fèvre, 1881, pp. 85-87; Monstrelet, 1826 b, pp. 71-81). Meanwhile, the French and Scottish writers largely blamed the Lombard and Gascon cavalry rather than praised the English courage. (See: Bueil, 2020, p. 145; *Journal d'un Bourgois*, 1881, pp. 197-98; *Chroniques de Normandie*, 1881, p. 72; Basin, 1855, p. 49; Buchannan, 1880, p. 361). This is useful because it provides a narrative from which to extrapolate the "ideal" behaviors and attitudes of soldiers during the period. This focus on defending the memory of war will also help identify what made violence acceptable to front-line soldiers rather than canonical lawyers or theologians.

Even though Waurin's history was at times unoriginal or completely fantastical in detail, it should not be discarded as irrelevant. He was not writing a modern history and should not be judged by those standards. When writing chronicles or histories, medieval authors were not engaging in a separate academic discipline as it is known today. Instead, these texts were part of the wider subject of rhetoric. Taught in cathedral schools, the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, formed the training of these author's and thus had a profound impact on their writings. Using rhetoric, these historical works used tropes developed from both classical and biblical authors to attempt to teach, to move, and to communicate with their readers. (Smalley, 1974, pp. 15-67; Kempshaw, 2011, pp. 3-4, pp. 8-9). History was not supposed to be objective instead it was used to defend or accuse the past and to teach virtuous action to future generations. Along with this, plagiarism was not objected to. Whole passages could be copied without citations. This

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was thought to be authoritative, as authors relied on others when they themselves couldn't be trusted to give an "accurate" account of an event. The authors purposely said they were committed to "accuracy" in their prologues, saying they only wrote about things they witnessed or heard from reliable sources. (Brown-Grant, 2020, pp. 248-49). These authors were writing to entertain courts, praise patrons, and gain money; but they also wanted to pass on certain ideas to posterity, which they found fundamental to the world around them.

Additionally, to the medieval historical tradition, Waurin was also influenced by the medieval "just war tradition." This can generally be identified with two ideas which limited warfare. The first, which is now labelled by just war theorists as *jus ad bellum* [justice when going to war], argued that a just war needed to have a just cause, the correct authority, virtuous intention and be fought out of necessity. (Gratian, 2010, C. 23, q. 2, cc. 1-3; Aquinas, 2006, IIa, IIae, q. 40, a. 1; Legnano, 1917, pp. 234-35; Bonet, 1949, pp. 128-29; Cox, 2015, pp. 110-16; *inter alia*.). The second, labelled *jus in bello* [justice within war], limited soldiers' actions in combat. It protected non-combatants and argued that force should only be used when appropriately necessary and proportionate to the threat. (Aquinas, IIa IIae, q. 40, aa. 3-4; Legnano, 1917, pp. 270-73; Bonet, 1949, pp. 149-55, pp.179-92; Cox, *inter alia*.).[11] This intellectual definition of the just war tradition would have been known to Waurin, as the war treatise *The Tree of Battles* by Honoré Bouvet (c. 1340 -1410) (based largely on the work of the jurist Giovanni da Legnano (c. 1320-1383)) was widely read throughout France along with Christine de Pizan's *Deeds and Arms of Chivalry*, which was largely based on the works of both Bouvet and Legnano. (Willard, 2003, p. 6-8). Yet, Waurin's descriptions of justice do not perfectly represent the clerical/intellectual/legal definition of justice. Waurin was most concerned with correct authority and the keeping of justice throughout a domain. With this goal in mind, he often portrayed violence in warfare as not only necessary, but beneficial. Yet, Waurin's own, possibly traumatic, experience of war tempered this image. He presented a dual nature of war filled with both horror and an admiration towards Christian violence. This juxtaposition between violence and virtue permeated the account at Verneuil and was used to defend himself and his former comrades. Ultimately, he attempted to control the memory of just cause and just authority to promote a personal defence and to rationalize

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his chivalric worldview. This meant that through the pursuit of justice, violence on the battlefield promoted and advanced Christian piety.

Cause, Authority, and Intention

Waurin's justification through memory began with defending the English reason, authority, and intention for going to war. Unlike the traditional just war tradition, where all three were given equal weight in determining a just conflict, Waurin placed a larger emphasis on just authority. Although not entirely critical of war, as argued below, Waurin believed that the horrors of war were necessary to establish and defend God's established authority on Earth. In this case, Henry VI, and his regent John Duke of Bedford, alone had authority to rule the kingdom of France. The war was needed to end what would have been seen as a rebellion under the pretence of the Dauphin Charles (the future king Charles VII). Thus, for Waurin the "just cause" was equated with the idea of "just authority." Authority in warfare was traditionally limited to the powers of a *princeps* [prince].(Gratian, 2010, C. 23, q. 2, dac 1; Aquinas, 2006, IIa IIae q. 20 a.1; Legnano, 1917, pp. 234-35; Bonet, 1949, pp. 128-29). Waurin emplotted several details into this narrative, which fully argued that Bedford alone had the authority of a *princeps* to rule France. This authority authorized him to correctly wage war against those who were still loyal to the Valois dynasty. This perspective on his own personal memories justified Waurin's own response when going to war against the French and justified his own chivalric ideals.

The sections detailing the just authority and just cause of the English was in the description Bedford's livery, his banners, and his battle oration. Waurin described Bedford's appearance this way:

> *Tout ce voyage le duc de Bethfort, chevaulchant devant ses battailles, avoit vestu une robe de drap de veloux asur, et par dessus avoit une grande croix blance, par deseure laquele avoit une croix vermeille;*
> [Throughout this journey the Duke of Bedford, riding before his battle lines, was dressed in a blue velvet robe, and upon which was a large white cross on top of a red cross]. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 68; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 101).

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Waurin was clearly impressed with Bedford's appearance and spent much space detailing and explaining its significance. According to Michael Jones (2002, pp. 34-38), this dress likely matched an image of St. George which was carried by the Duke of Bedford in a prayer book. This placed the duke in the role of St. George, England's martial saint. St. George, as personified by Bedford, was acting to deliver justice for the English cause. Waurin continued:

> *et moy actuer de ceste euvre, quy lors estoie audit voyage en la compaignie du conte de Salisbery, demanday a aulcuns Anglois a quel cause ledit duc de Betfort portoit la croix blance, il me fut respondu que cestoit a cause des deux royualmes, et que au duc de Bethfort regent apartenoit les porter, et a nul autre...*
> [and I the author of this work, who was there on the said journey, in the company of the earl of Salisbury, asked some of the English why the said Duke of Bedford carried the white cross, [they] responded that it was because of the two kingdoms, and that [the cross] belonged the Duke of Bedford to carry, and no other... (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 68; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 101).

Bedford marched into battle boldly declaring the just cause on his chest. Waurin made this memorable both through symbolic imagery (the crosses) and by explanation (the English soldier's answer). This ensured that the message would not be missed and would stick in the minds of Waurin's listeners/readers. He was declaring that his cause was blessed by God, both to inspire the English and to frighten the French.[12] To Waurin this was notable enough to interrupt the martial narrative and present the army in awe towards the regent. Through this message Waurin argued before his audience that the English had been divinely guided and had acted according to contemporary laws of war.

This declaration of just authority was matched by the banners under which the duke rode.[13] There were five banners, symbolizing the five offices to the authorities to which he either held or was in obedience towards. He rode under the banner of three golden fleur-de-lis, under the banner of St. George, the banner of St. Edward the Confessor, the royal banner of the quartered arms of France and England and his own ducal banner. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 69). Banners held several functions. They were practical, used so soldiers could identify the location of their commanders on the battlefield. They were used for memorial practices, ensuring heralds could know, remember, and record who fought at each battle. Finally, they were also symbols of

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authority. A banneret was a higher level of commander either inherited or earned on the battlefield. To ride with a banner symbolized one's authority, to ride under a banner represented one's service to that specific lord. (Jones, 2010, pp. 16-19, pp. 28-29, pp. 37-43, p. 55). Therefore, Bedford's banners embodied God's gift of authority to him, his transferred royal authority as regent, as well as his own personal authority as a duke. This was a direct, visible, and memorable statement that argued for the justifications of his actions. His ducal banner represented his prowess as a knight and the authority to command his ducal lands and soldiers. He rode under the banners of the kingdoms of England and France, as well as the banners of the saints, to demonstrate his divine service and subordination to King Henry VI. As a duke he could command soldiers on the battlefield, as regent he could command soldiers to go to war, and as the personification and servant of the saints he could demand the restoration of temporal authority. This would have been a powerful statement to Waurin's audience, and its symbolism would have been readily understood. Like his livery, Bedford had the authority and duty to wage war within France, justifying his actions and the actions of those serving under him. Under these offices, only the English soldiers were justified and legally allowed to kill those who refused to accept Lancastrian rule.

This idea of just authority was also reiterated in Bedford's battlefield oration. It also spoke toward Waurin's desire to portray the English army with virtuous intentions. Waurin, described it this way:

> *Pluiseurs belles exhortacions et remoustrances,, en les admonnestant du bien faire, aians souvenance que pour le service du roy leur souverain seigneur avoient delaissie pays, terres, peres, meres, femmes et enfans, et que a juste et leale cause ilz se combatissent hardiement, car France estoit leur vray heritage, lequel leur occupoit et empeschoit Charles de Vallois a present soy disant roy de France.*
> [[H]e made many fine exhortations...admonishing them to do well, to recall that for their service of the king, their sovereign lord, they had left the country, lands, fathers, mothers, wives, and children, and that they should fight bravely for a just and lawful cause, for France was their true heritage, which Charles of Valois, at present calling himself king of France, occupied and withheld from them.] (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 73; Waurin, 1879 b, pp. 108-09).

As commented on by both Anne Curry (2008, pp. 78-79) and John Bleise (1989, p.204), battlefield orations in chivalric chronicles were writings of similitude, that is a

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partial fiction with the appearance of reality. These were tropes written by various chroniclers throughout the Middle Ages, which represented possibly realistic but also idealistic motivations of the soldiers. (Bliese, 1989, pp. 201-26). This is not to say that the orations were completely fictitious. Waurin (along with other chroniclers) used the dialogue to identify certain realistic motivating factors and then forge what they wanted the audience to remember. In this case, Waurin wanted to emphasize this particular army's motivation toward the higher virtue of justice rather than the baser desires of wealth or glory.[14] Waurin stated that Bedford mainly tried to inspire the army by the "just and lawful cause" for which they were fighting. This cause was more important than their homes and their families, as they were restoring God's given authority to France. It also spoke volumes to the army's just intention and piety. Having the correct intention was imperative to the overall justice of the campaign and to pragmatically ensure God's blessing in the battle. Rather than fight for a love of money or out of fear, they were fighting for the just cause as explained by their leader the Duke of Bedford. This is not to say that wealth or glory were wrong motivating factors. The pursuit of wealth through plunder could still be appropriate under the contemporary law of war. (Cox, 2015, pp. 113-16; Bonet, 1949, pp. 153-54, Legnano, 1917, p. 269). Yet it should not have been the main motivating factor. The absence of these motivators would have been notable to his audience and further developed their own perspectives of this pastevent, understanding that this was an army fighting a just cause with complete virtuous intention.[15]

Waurin also ensured just authority and just intention of the English army was remembered through their public acts of piety. The author described both the English leadership and soldiers as placing their spiritual well-being as pre-eminent amongst their priorities. Within the narrative the Duke of Bedford prepared for battle by first celebrating the feast of the Assumption of St. Mary, taking mass, and having a drink of alcohol before preparing his soldiers. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 67, p. 72). This was copied by the English soldiers the night before engaging the French at Verneuil:

> *Si se disposerent de leurs consciences comme tous ce soir et le matin selon la coustume de faire Anglois quant ilz atendent terme dentrer en battaille, car de leur propre nature ilz sont tres devotz, devant boire espcialement*
>
> [That evening, they [the English] nearly all set-in order their consciences and, in the morning, according to the custom of the English, when they are awaiting

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> the time for going into battle, for of their own nature they are very devout especially before drinking.](Waurin, 1879 b, p. 109; Waurin, 1879 a, p. 73).

This was a common trope in medieval chronicles, used by contemporary and previous chroniclers to denote Christian piety before battle. (e.g. before the battle of Agincourt see: Monstrolet, 1826 a, pp. 335-36; le Fèvre, 1876, p. 244). The trope was usually used in conjunction with a comparison with the other side. For example, during the Agincourt narrative, Waurin talked about the English piously confessing their sins in silence as the French boisterously placed bets on the next day's ransoms. (Waurin, 1868 a, pp. 201-02). Interestingly this was one major difference between Waurin and Monstrelet in the Verneuil narrative. Monstrelet only talked about the French getting ready to die, while Waurin only talked about the English. (Monstrolet, 1826 b, p. 75). On a pragmatic level it might simply mean that Waurin could not hear the French and that the French were likely doing similarly pious activities. The absence presented the French in a neutral light. They were not stereotypically evil, but misguided. It placed the focus on the justified English ensuring that the readers/listeners knew that the English had had pure hearts and the intention to courageously fight their enemies. The need for courage was shown to counteract the presence of fear as described in the text. Waurin stated that the English felt a "*ung moult grant effroy* [very great alarm]" upon the arrival of the French. (Waurin, 1879 b, pp. 69-70). The soldiers feared their counterparts who, according to Waurin, outnumbered them by more than one-half. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 77). Waurin's recorded memory was needed to shape the narrative of his contemporaries, ensuring both the overall cause was just as well as the individual desires in the army. This idealised the English and ensured there was no doubt whom God had chosen.

Waurin added the statements of fear to further add to the English side's virtuous appearance. The presence of fear did not negate chivalry or virtue but proved its existence at that moment. The fourteenth-century jurist and author of the first canonical treatise on war, Giovanni da Legnano defined courage as a cardinal virtue. He said "*timor et audacia sunt passiones contrariae, fortitudo est virtus* media...[Fear and audacity are opposite feelings; fortitude is the virtue between them...]" (Legnano, 1917, p. 99, p. 240). If no fear had been present then the English would have been at risk for possessing the vice of rashness, the extreme opposite of cowardice, between which was the virtue of courage.

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Additionally, these soldiers were afraid for the correct reasons. The answers to the fear brought on by the French army were both spiritual (pious exercises) and practical (consuming alcohol). They dealt with their fear by ensuring that they would die within the grace of God. They also pragmatically encouraged themselves with drink to ensure this intention would stay steadfast. This contrasts with both the townspeople of Verneuil who were so afraid at the sight of the French that they immediately surrendered, and the Norman deserters who left Bedford's army and joined the French in hopes of despoiling the English. (Waurin, 1879a, pp. 70-71; pp. 80-81). Bedford continued to inspire this intention to justice and courage by searing a vow after hearing of the French retreat to Vernueil. "*jura Saint George de non jamais sejourner ou arrester jusques a ce quil combatu ses annemis*...[[He] swore by Saint George never to rest or halt until he should have fought his enemies.]" (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 72; Waurin 1879 b, p. 107). Bedford said this after hearing his scouts' reports of the location and size of the French force. He knew he was facing a much larger army. Rather than retreat to Rouen he stayed steadfast in his appeals to justice and courageously pursued the French. The regent then tied the English horses together, both as a precaution from theft, but also to ensure that the English could not lose heart and flee. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 74). This was a powerful statement of intention to courageously face the enemy in the pursuit of justice or death. In the context of memory, Waurin was portraying an army fully committed to the mission, having taken both physical and spiritual steps to ensure the battle would be met with the correct intentions and chivalric courage.

Having accomplished this and being victorious, Bedford completed justice through two final acts of piety. After narrating the English victory, and after listing the names of those killed or captured, Waurin (following Monstrelet) finished the narrative saying:

> *en grant humilite remercya son Createur, les yeulz contre le ciel et les mains joinctes, de la bonne adventure quil luy avoit envoyee...*
> [with great humility [the Duke of Bedford] gave thanks to his Creator, with eyes turned towards heaven and hands clasped, for the good success which He had sent him...] (Waurin, 1879a, p. 79; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 118; Monstrelet, 1824 b, p. 79).

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This was reiterated after the duke had returned to Rouen. He immediately went to the church of Nôtre Dame where Waurin said:

> "*ou il sagenouilla devant lautel; sy rendy graces et loenges a son benoit Createur et a la glorieuse virege Marie Sa mere*
>
> [where he knelt before the altar, and so rendered thanks and praises to his blessed Creator and to the glorious Virgin Mary His mother...] (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 82; Waurin 1879 b, pp. 121-22).

Like the battle oration, or the prayers before the battle, prayers after a victory were common tropes to symbolize piety in the event of a victory. (e. g. Henry V after Agincourt, Waurin, 1868 a, p. 214). Although only a copied trope, it was still a conscious decision to continually describe this action. If taken seriously, as per the Catholic worldview of the author, these prayers and public declarations were necessary ways to demonstrate a continued intention of justice through the entire conflict. Bedford had to ensure that he was not seen as prideful after the victory to ensure God's continued blessings. Additionally, to be completely just and courageous throughout the campaign, Bedford's actions also had to be in adherence to the other "cardinal virtues" of prudence and temperance. (Legnano, 1917, pp. 242-45). To either boast or stay silent after a victory would cause injustice. Both would be a lie, declaring that he and his army had won the battle on their own. In this narrative Bedford gained victory through God's help and prudently gave Him the credit. The audience would have felt the finality of this action. Bedford had justly commanded the war, piously prepared himself to kill others, and had rightly concluded this punitive action with prayers.

Waurin's narrative places emphasis on the justice of the English cause based on correct authority with virtuous intentions. According to the author, the English had just cause to fight the French due to their continued resistance to Henry VI. Henry was God's chosen king in France, and this inspired a religious and martial response against the French army. John Duke of Bedford wore this just cause on his livery, he marched under banners declaring just authority, and publicly prayed to ensure just intention. The virtuous English actions before and after the battle also ensured that they would be remembered as being fully justified in the retelling. It seems that Waurin did not want anything to

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distract from this insistence of their right actions in the war. These details established a framework from which a defence of the carnage experienced in battle can be described, explained, and justified.

Death, Justice, and Courage

Waurin's defence of killing in battle was not uncritical of combat itself. One of the most insightful sections of Waurin's account is his description of the melee at the height of the battle. Waurin unexpectedly used a complex combination of positive and negative expressions to describe his experience on that day. The battle was overwhelmingly chaotic, fearful, and dangerous, filled with loud sounds and traumatic images. The soldiers' fear intensified after the two lines faced each other across the battlefield. Waurin was awed by the French saying: "car *sans faulte moy acteur de ceste euvre navoie jamais veu plus belle* compaignie...[Without a doubt, I the author of this work had never seen a more beautiful company..." (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 73; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 109). This awe was mixed with fear and as the English and Scottish archers began to shoot at one another, '*sy cruelement que horreur estoit a les regarder, car ilz amenoient la mort a ceulz quilz ataingnoient*...[[they fired] so cruelly that it was a horror to look upon them, for they carried death to those whom they struck...] Underneath this arrow barrage, the French marched "*moult fierement* [very proudly]" against the English and the English "*moult vigoreusement leur* coururent [rushed vigorously]" against the French. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75; Waurin 1879 b, p. 111). Once the two sides met, the soldiers crushed into each other with loud shouts on both sides. "*Si estoit la huee tant horrible, quil nestoit homme tant feust hardy ou asseure quy ne doubtast la mort*...[So horrible was the shouting that there was no man so brave or confident that he was not in fear of death...]" (Waurin, 1879 a, 75; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 112). As the battle continued, the dead began to pile up leaving a horrible sight amongst the living. Waurin described the overall scene this way:

> *Estoit grant horreur et pitie inreparable de ainsy veoir Christiennete destruire lun lautre, car durant ceste pitoiable et mortele bataille misericorde ny avoit lieu, tant heoient les parties lun lautre: le sang des mors estendus sur terre et des navrez couroit par grans ruisseaulz parmy le champ.*

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> [[it] was a great horror and irreparable pity to see Christian people destroy one another [in such a way], for during this pitiable and deadly battle there was no place for mercy, so much did the parties hate each other: The blood of the slain stretched upon the ground, and that of the wounded, ran in great streams about the field.] (Waurin, 1979 a p, 75; Waurin 1879 b, p. 112).

These many quotations demonstrate the seriousness of this battle and the emotional hardships involved with combat. These do not describe a gloriously chivalric encounter, but one of men who were afraid and fighting for their lives amongst scenes of butchery. One of the main characteristics of this battle was also how equal both sides were. Waurin reiterated this fact several times. He first said:

> *nestoit lors en memore dhomme davoir veu deux si puissantes parties par tel espace egallement combatre sans povoir parchevoir a quy a tourneroit la perte ou* victoire.
> [it was not in the memory of man to have seen two parties so mighty for such a space of time fighting in equal manner without being able to perceive who would turn the loss or victory.] (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 113).

Then he reiterated it two more times saying, "*estoit en grant bransle* ...[the battle] was in great uncertainty [lit. in a great wobble]" and "*tant quon ne scavoit que penser ymaginer comment la besongne termineroit*...[one knew not what to think nor to imagine how the affair would terminate...]" (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 76-77; Waurin 1879 b, p. 114).[16] The uncertainty, the fear, the noise, the death, the violence would have been overwhelming. This experience of cruelty is persistent through the account and the readers and hearers would have been able to feel the emotions and understand the weight of the battle that Waurin experienced. The horrors described in the narrative provide the necessary context in which the reader/hearer could understand the justice and courage of the English soldiers. Although this was at least a partially honest account about the cruelty of combat, Waurin used these emotional passages rhetorically to form the future memory of that day. As already discussed, Waurin thought this violence was necessary to bring justice to the kingdom of France. However, the battle was not just a means of justice, but was just in itself. It along with the sieges of Ivry and Verneuil, and post-war punitive action demonstrated that Bedford had the actual ability to bring justice (*de facto*) as well as the legal authority to command it (*de iure*). This ability to bring justice to the kingdom

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was conspicuously contrasted with the dauphin's inability to bring justice. God had blessed Bedford with the ability to carry out his just cause, and in return Bedford acted within a just manner.

Bedford followed the *ius armorum* [law of arms] closely while taking the towns of Ivry and Verneuil. (Cox, 2015, pp. 99-124; Bradbury, 1992, pp. 308-33; Keen, 1965, esp. pp. 119-33). The narrative about Ivry was common to other narratives about sieges and were retold with a formulaic repetition.[17] Bedford besieged Ivry with overwhelming forces, so the commander of the town, Gerard de Palliers, made an agreement with Bedford assenting to surrender the town if not succoured by the dauphin before the Feast of Our Lady (15 August). This was a customary process for sieges in this period. (Jones, 2002, pp. 377-88; Keen, 1965, pp. 119-33; Bradbury, 1992, pp.296-97; 308-33). Waurin added details to this common description to emphasize the poor actions of the French leadership. The French commanders had promised to give succour to Palliers with a letter sealed by eighteen French lords. (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 69). And yet, when they saw the English in a strong position, they fell back. (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 69-70). Although a sensible military decision, it would have been seen as a non-chivalric act of cowardice and an unjust perfidious action. (Bradbury, 1992, pp. 296-97). The French outnumbered the English around 2:1 and yet still fled the field, while perfidiously breaking an oath. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 70).[18] By proxy, these lords' failure to succour Ivry and to keep the peace was Charles' failure to provide help or stability to his kingdom.[19] After failing to keep their oaths, the French then deceptively took the town of Verneuil. They lied, saying that they had just defeated the English. The French deception was not necessarily wrong. Deception was legal in medieval law and customary practice. (Whetham, 2009, pp. 244-51; Legnano, 1917, p. 271; Bonet, 1949, pp. 154-55). In previous narratives Waurin positively described deception as a keen way to avoid a siege. (e.g. Crevant (1423) Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 34-38). However, to do this after failing to give aid to one's own captain was shameful, especially as it was sworn by an oath and sealed by a legal document. This was a cowardly and unjust act that needed to be punished.

The descriptions of the horror of the battle and the portrayal of the French were contrasted with the actions of the duke of Bedford, the earl of Salisbury, and the English army whose actions in the battle were defended through both ideas of chivalry and justice. The English actions on the battlefield were filled with fortitude in the face of

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overwhelming odds. This behaviour would have powerfully defended their cause in the opinions of Waurin's knightly audience. As the battle began, with horrible sounds filling the air, the soldiers of both sides shouted out the names of their patron saints, "Saint Denis!" and "Saint George!" (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75). There were clarion calls and trumpets to motivate the combatants and inspire courage at this critical moment of the battle. They called on their saints to fight for them, inspiring both physical and spiritual courage. The English soldiers, with great fortitude, held the line against the French and fought fiercely. Waurin stated, "*Mainte prinse et mainte rescousse ye furent faites*...[Many a capture and many a rescue was made there...]" (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 112). The response to the horrors of war was inspiring calls and acts of heroism. Both sides showed exhilarating and heroic actions against each other, doing the traditional medieval combative actions of capturing and saving others. Yet this quote finishes with the gory description of blood flowing from the dead and wounded across the battlefield. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75). This mixture of heroic and terrible descriptions was intentional to make the English seem even more virtuous and chivalric. They were afraid for their lives, exhausted and confused, and yet they continued to fight. The greatest praise was given to the archers assigned to the English rear to protect the baggage. The archers bravely held the rear against the Lombard and Gascon cavalry, who at the time were the most well armoured and finest cavalry force in Western Europe. (Jones, 2002, 390-91; Blair, 1958, pp. 41-42.) Waurin described the event, "*trouverent barrieres et resistence...les recoeillerent vigoureusement et misrent en fuite*...[the French cavalry] found there barriers and opposition...[the English archers] received them vigorously and put them to flight..." (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 76; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 113). The lightly armoured archers bravely stood up to the heavily armoured enemy horse, and forced them to flee, before rushing to reinforce the English front line. Waurin described it this way:

> *lesquelz quant ilz veyrent leurs annemis fuyr coeillerent vigueur, furent grant cause de la victoire, car voians le debat tant estable, ainsi fres et nouveaulz quilz estoient, en gectant ung merveilleux cry se vindrent en tourpiant mettre au front devant de leur battaille... qui moult estoient lassez de combatre...se prindrent un pou a faindre et reculler; et au contraire les Anglois voiens quil en estoit heure sesvertuerent, tout a ung faix recoeillant* vigueur.
>
> [when they saw their enemies flee they gathered strength, and were a great cause of the victory; for seeing the conflict so decided, they, fresh and new as they were, raising a wonderful shout, came wheeling round and put themselves

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> in the front before their army...[the French] who were much wearied by fighting...began to lose a little heart and [started] to fall back; while on the contrary the English, seeing that now was the time for it, exerted themselves all at once recovering [their] strength.](Waurin, 1879 a, p. 77; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 115).

The lightly armoured, common archers were able to withstand the heavily armoured and noble French and Lombard cavalry, and still be fresh enough to reinforce the line and turn the tide in favour of the English.[20] To repulse the cavalry would have been an impressive feat on its own, but they were able to regroup, and were still fresh enough to charge into the melee and support the English line. At this point on the English prowess and steadfastness overthrew what was left of the impressive French discipline and courage. The French became "*descomforter* [dismayed]" and "*perdant du tout lesperance* [lost all hope]" and ran, "*ains chascun deulz queroit lieu pour soy povoir sauver* [each one [was] suffering [and] sought out a place where he could save himself]." (Waurin, 1979 b p. 115).

In contrast to the French senior leadership, which was conspicuously absent from the proceedings, Bedford and Salisbury were powerfully present in front of the army. Waurin described Salisbury this way:

> *et je acteur scayveritablement que cellui jour le conte de Salesbery soustint le pus grant faix, non obstant quil bransla grandement et eult moult fort a faire de soy entrentenir, et certainement se neust este le sens et brant vaillance et conduite de sa seulle personne emmy les vaillans hommes quy se combatoient desoubz sa banier a son exemple moult vigoureusement, il nest pas doubte que la chose quy estoit en grant bransle ne feust tres mal allee pour les Anglois...*
>
> [and I the author know truly that that day the earl of Salisbury sustained the greatest brunt, notwithstanding that he greatly wavered and had very much to do to maintain his position, and certainly if it had not been for the skill and great valour and conduct of his single person in the midst of the valiant men who fought very vigorously under his banner after his example, there is no doubt that the matter, which was in great uncertainty, would have gone very badly for the English...](Waurin, 1879 a, p. 76; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 114).

Waurin began his statement by elaborating on the danger that Salisbury was in, then the earl's courageous actions, and finally the inspiration it proved to the English soldiers. Salisbury himself faced and withstood the greatest "brunt," as the highest value

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target in that area of the battlefield. This in turn inspired further acts of prowess amongst the soldiers. Which Waurin likely hoped would inspire acts of prowess made by his audience in future Burgundian conflicts. It is important to note that at the time of writing (c. mid 1460s) the current holder of the earldom of Salisbury was Richard Neville, also the earl of Warwick, "the kingmaker." (Hicks, 1998, p. 7). This account was a powerful representation of Warwick's grandfather Thomas Montagu the fourth earl of Salisbury. Waurin likely used this memory to promote the family of the powerful earl, likely in hopes of patronage. This is especially likely due to Waurin's later descriptions of Richard Neville and his meeting the earl on his trip to England in 1469. (Visser-Fuchs, 2002, pp. 145-56). Nevertheless, the description is potent. Waurin gave credit to Salisbury alone for courageously holding the line as an example to all his soldiers around him, despite the dangers and horrors around him. This in turn was likely to inspire others in the future.

Likewise, Bedford was given a long, chivalric description of fighting in the front line. As Waurin was fighting under Salisbury, the author admitted that he did not personally see Bedford but heard of his feats from others. He detailed Bedford fighting with a two-handed axe against the aggressive Scottish infantry under the earl of Douglas. He stated:

> *et occist maint homme...nataindoit nul quil ne courouchast, comme celluy quy estoit grant de corpz et gros de membrez sage et hardy en armes...*
>
> [[He] killed many a man...he reached no one whom he did not punish, since he was large in body and stout in limb, wise and brave in arms...] (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 76-77; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 114).

Bedford's courage was matched by his perfect knightly image. One consequence of Bedford's unusual clothing would have been to ensure that all knew who he was and where he was during the battle. He made himself a target to demonstrate the justness of the English cause and inspire the army. He was courageous, present in a way that ensured that he was known; pious, dressed as England's warrior saint; he was strong, wielding a heavy battle axe; and he was intelligent, having studied and trained in the art of war. Both he and Salisbury were examples of commanders dealing with emotional stress and keeping the battle line together. As terror was the natural response to this type of danger

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and sensory experience so commanders needed to face the horror with courage and prowess to best protect their soldiers. Likewise, the soldiers needed to look to their commanders for inspiration during these difficult circumstances. The emotional result of this courage in the face of terror and horror was first steadfastness and then exhilaration. One can feel Waurin's excitement at sharing this experience. Salisbury's "great skill and valour" and the soldiers "vigorous" fighting, and the "punishment" of Bedford all gave language to an experience that to Waurin was both horrible and wonderful. The negative descriptions of the battle helped increase the positive ideas of courage and justice. The memory of that day was that much more joyous, more just, more filled with prowess for it being so dangerous and horrible.

Waurin's language of Bedford's actions also gave them a legal element. Waurin chose to say that Bedford "*courouchast* [lit. punish in great anger]." This was important because it signified the legal authority upon which Bedford's actions were based. He was punishing a great crime, rebels who had failed to recognize their true king. He was also punishing them for crimes done during the Armagnac and Burgundian civil war. This latter point was given special attention by Waurin while he listed the dead French combatants. In the middle of a long list of French noble dead, Waurin stated that William II the Viscount of Narbonne was found among the dead.

> *le visconte de Nerbonne, lequel gisant mort entre les autres, par lordonnace et commandement du duc de bethfort fut prins et esquartele et son corpz pendu au gibet pour la trahison que fait avoit davoir este consentant et lun des facteurs de mettre a mort le duc Jehan de Bourguoigne defunct;*
>
> [the viscount of Narbonne, who, lying dead among the others, by order and command of the Duke of Bedford was taken and quartered, and his body hanged on the gibbet, for the treason that he had done in having consented to and having been one of the actors in putting to death the deceased John duke of Burgundy.] (Waurin, Vol. 3, p. 79).

Earlier in the *Collection*, Waurin named Narbonne as one of the key Armagnac conspirators during the murder of John Duke of Burgundy in 1419. (Waurin, 1864a, pp. 274-75). Narbonne had personally stabbed the duke's guard in the back as others killed the duke himself. The dauphin, beyond being disloyal to the true king Henry VI, had failed to bring the murderers to justice. Bedford was so committed to justice that he

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essentially tried and punished the viscount's body, treating him as a brigand (*latronum*), rather than a public enemy (*hostes*). (Russell, 1975, p. 45; *Digest*, 1985, 50.16.118).[21] The inclusion of the body's desecration further evidenced Bedford's correct intentions and his dedication of performing justice. Waurin also presented a vignette after the battle recounted how a group of Norman soldiers deserted the English after seeing that the English were outnumbered. (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 80-81). Like Narbonne, Bedford treated them as criminals. He killed them and seized their movable goods and lands while incorporating them into the king's household and to those whom he thought fought well during the battle. (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 80-81). This followed the just war tradition as the "*principis porico* [prince's portion/purse]" or the ability to take property after a punitive action (either a battle or an execution) and give it as a reward to the *princeps*' followers. (Gratian, 2010, D.1, c. 10; Legnano, 1917, p. 269; Bonet, 1946, pp. 153-54). Once again, the duke was showing his legal authority and his actual power to carry out justice within France, unlike the dauphin and his subordinates.

It is difficult to know how Waurin felt about the deaths that occurred during the battle. He did not give a description of the English mourning the French, as he had at Agincourt. (Waurin, 1868 a, p. 216). We can only postulate from his previous comments within the narrative. He had described killing as a "*horreur* horror" in two places during the account. The first, while describing the deaths inflicted by the English and Scottish archers and the second after being saddened at Christians killing one another. (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 75; Waurin, 1879 b, p.112). However, he did not judge the mass killing of the French during the closing phases of the battle. After the archers had bravely reinforced the line, the English broke through the French ranks and caused a French route. Afterwards they began to kill all they could find. Waurin described it this way: "*commencerent de occir et mettre a mort cruelement tous ceulz quilz povoient aconsievyr, sans avoir quelque pitie*...[[they] began to kill and cruelly put to death all those whom they were able to overtake, without having any pity...]" (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 77; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 115). He may have thought it would have been obvious that this was a further horror. However, I think it more likely that he was simply demonstrating the "professionalism" of the English army. Rather than chaotically competing with one another for captures and ransoms, the English continued to work together to complete the victory. What was horrific about the previous killings was the death of the justified

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English soldiers. Although seeing Christian knights slain on the battlefield of any nation was a "horror," Waurin thought the French deserved to die. Waurin's "negative" comments could be taken out of context and used as a knightly critique of warfare. However, in Waurin's worldview there was no contradiction between horrific killing and Christian practice. This reflected the tension in medieval society between its Christian and martial elements. Especially given that Waruin was memorializing the English as the "ideal army" this consent to the brutal route of the French is striking. The audience did not need to hear a defence of this, because Waurin had already justified the English according to contemporary custom. The Duke of Bedford was both an image of a justified Christian authority, but also killed many men with a two-handed axe. The English were pious before the battle, but then killed without mercy or pity. These "contradictions" point towards a complex relationship with warfare, one that was both virtuous but also realistically brutal. Waurin did not give any indication of inconsistency with these two views. The armies could be both viciously violent and have Christian piety and it did not seem to be worthy of comment within the Burgundian court. What mattered was who was justified, and the chivalric virtue shown while pursuing justice.

Conclusion

Waurin ended the narrative by describing Bedford's triumphal entry into Rouen after his victory. Bedford was met by his wife, the burgesses, and the clergy of the town in a community-wide celebration in memory of the victory. The text said:

> *Estoient les rues tendues et par tous les quarfours ou il devoit passer estoient hourdemens ou quarees dhystores par personnages; et mesmes allerent audevant de luy les jennes gens et enfans de la cite par manier de belles compaignies, moustrant grant exaltation de joye pour sa glorieuse et belle victoire...*
>
> [the streets were decorated with hangings, and at all the intersections where he [Bedford] was to pass, there were platforms erected where persons represented historical scenes; and there also went to meet him the young people and children of the city in fair companies showing a high degree of joy for his glorious and beautiful victory...] (Waurin, 1879 a, p. 81; Waurin, 1879 b, p. 121).

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This detail is interesting for the topic of memory and justice because it demonstrated how Waurin and, if true, the people of Rouen saw themselves within the context of history. Their identity and their present actions were greatly shaped by events of the past. This was a memory to be recorded by both words (Waurin's history) and action (within historical pageants). It was being passed onto the young people and children of the city to emulate the actions of the great men of the past and Bedford, the great man of the present. Waurin's narrative makes it clear that it was the justice and prowess involved in the victory that was "glorious and beautiful." This memory was worth celebrating and recounting because it was done virtuously and competently.

Looking at this retrospectively, Waurin was clearly making a defence of his own actions. At the time of its writing, the English had lost their long-held lands of Gascony after the defeat of Castillon in 1453 and due to the civil war between the York and Lancastrian branches of the Plantagenets, the war in France was effectively over. (Curry,1993, pp. 115-21). Additionally, the Duke of Bedford had died long before this in 1435. (Stratford, 2011). As an Anglophile, Waurin still might have believed the English crown laid proper claim to the throne of France, but due to the strength of Charles VII's court, as well as the English civil war in the 1460s, this claim could not be realistically achieved. Waurin might have hoped for a future English invasion of France, but in this instance personal justification was predominate. Waurin admitted that he saw combat in this narrative and needed to show that he had acted rightly in the past. (Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 76-77). He needed to prove to posterity that his military career, and the careers of his military heroes, belonged in the long line of other historical accomplishments recorded in his work, despite the long-term failure of the cause. This would have confirmed his own worldview about the rightness of chivalric warfare in the pursuit of correct, God-given hierarchies. He wanted to convince future readers to emulate the lives of these men, in what would mean a better, more virtuous future.

Bedford represented the just and God-given authority given to the English crown over the kingdom of France. Waurin's descriptions of Bedford's livery, his banners, words, and his piety ensured the reader would understand that the English had just cause and were blessed by God as a result. By dressing as St. George, Bedford was declaring his intention to act as the saint's hands doing the work of God. By standing under the banners of the English saints, and the royal banners of France and England, he was stating

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that he was acting under the authority of these greater powers. These symbols justified his actions, and the deeds of his army within the battle. The battle was horrific, but it was necessary. The English killed without mercy or pity because it was their Christian duty to restore God's rightful hierarchy and to punish those who refused to accept their true king. Importantly for justice, the English acted within the law of arms and customary moral convention. Importantly for the chivalric genre of history, they did this with prowess, staying steadfast in the face of a larger enemy who fought very well. All these details within the battle narrative relate to a wider meta-narrative. Waurin was writing within the historical and literary context of both the just war tradition and chivalric literature. His work consciously defended the English actions within that historical context. The English were justified because of their cause, their piety, and their chivalric courage. This in turn likely helped shaped the Burgundian court which continued to reiterate the themes of justice and chivalry. (Brusque, 2004, pp. 77-81). It was the commitment to these ideals that shaped this memory and made the memory worth remembering for future emulation and posterity.

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Abbreviations

C. Causa
q. questio
c. canon
dca dicta ante canon
IIa *Summa* Part II
IIae *Summa* Second Part of Part II
a. article

Notas

[1] I would like to thank Dr. Rory Cox for his comments in preparation for this article. All errors are my own.
[2] Another good example of this is John Keegan's *The Face of Battle*. (1978). For a more psychological approach to memory and combat see: Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen's *On Combat* (2008) and Grossman's *On Killing* (1995).

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[3] In this example the French historian Frantz Funck-Brentano (1862-1947) used Erasmus' (1466-1536) philosophy to argue that individual perspectives limited the accuracy of their accounts.
[4] For a good introduction to the battle see Jones, 2002, pp. 375-411.
[5] This deconstruction of the text has been used by several historians. See: White, 1987, pp. ix-xi; Fentress and Wickham, 1992, p. xi; Scholz, Schwelder, Sprenger, 2014, p. 7; Hutton, 1993, p. xvi; Geary, 1994, pp. 7-9, *inter alia*.).
[6] An excellent example of this technique in action is in Spiegel's article regarding Abbot Sugar see: Spiegel, 1986, pp. 151-58.
[7] This idea of memory's use for historical normalization is from Assmann, 1995, pp. 125-33.
[8] These included *Des Grantz Geantz, Historia Requm Britannie, The Brut, Le Chronique de Normandie*, and Jean Froissart's *Chroniques*.
[9] Chivalry has a long historiographical tradition. In this paper chivalry will refer to the cultural norms which promoted martial and Christian virtues amongst the noble class. See: Currey (ed.), 2019, pp. 133-52; Sposato and Claussen, 2019, pp. 99-118; Kaeuper, 2016; Strickland, 1996; Keen, 1984.
[10] These translations are my own, but I have referenced translations if they are available. Thus I have cited both the original and the consulted translation.
[11] The just war tradition has a long historiographical tradition. These are simplified criteria used for this paper, but their full presence within medieval texts has long been established. See: Brunstetter and O'Driscoll (eds.), 2018; Cox, 2015, pp. 99-125; Stacey, 1994, pp. 27-39; Johnson, 1975; Russell, 1975; Keen, 1965.
[12] Bedford's appearance scaring the French was also commented on by the fifteenth-century English chronicler Peter Basset. See: Jones, 2002, p. 400; Basset, Fifteenth-Century, f. 50v.

[13] For the importance of banners both symbolically and practically see: Jones, R.W. (2010), esp. pp. 37-55.
[14] For example, Henry V's Agincourt speech in Waurin's *Chronique*s talks about justice, courage, and wealth as motivating factors. See Curry, 2008, pp. 77-97.
[15] This can be contrasted to Waurin's record of Henry V's oration before Agincourt where he appealed to justice and courage but also to fear, saying the French were going to cut off captured archers' fingers. (Waurin, 1868 a, p. 203).
[16] This line was also in Monstrolet. See: Monstrolet, 1826 b, p. 76.
[17] For a few examples of Waurin's siege narratives see his accounts of the sieges of Rambouilet, le Mans, Moynier, and Zeneuberghue in Waurin, 1879 a, pp. 126-27, pp. 135-38.
[18] A note on numbers for the battle, Waurin, le Fèvre, and Monstrelet all say there were 9800 English against 18-20,000 French. (Waurin, 1879 a pp. 67-70, p. 78; Le Fèvre, 1881, pp. 83-84, p. 86; Monstrelet, 1826 b, p. 180, pp. 194-95). French sources vary but all agree that the French vastly outnumbered the English.
[19] More could be said about Bedford's victory demonstrating the inability of Charles to protect his own country. See: Rogers, 2002, pp. 33-78.
[20] Waurin's statement about the fate of the archers and the Lombard cavalry is very controversial as all the major non-Burgundian sources say the English archers fled from the cavalry, but instead of capitalizing on the route the knights plundered the baggage and fled. This was also supported by court cases See: *Journal d'un Bourgois*, 1881, pp. 197-98; *Chroniques de Normandie*, 1881, p. 72; Basin, 1855, p. 49; Buchannan, 1880, p. 361; *Actes of the Chancellerie*, 1907, pp. 97-99, pp. 103-04, pp. 124-27, pp. 173-76; Burne, 1956 p. 206; Jones, 2002, pp. 388-96. Burne argued that only a few English archers had fled giving rise to the rumour the English had lost the battle. Michael Jones, however, thought it was more likely that all 2000 archers in rear were routed before the English came back for a victory. I find this difficult to believe because breaking ranks like that would almost certainly be a cause for a defeat. Further research needs to be done on this part of the battle, which is beyond the scope of this paper focused on the eyewitness, written memory of Jean de Waurin.
[21] This legal designation came into canon law through the Roman law tradition. See: Russell, 1975.